How Europe’s radical right could hijack EU enlargement
Source: Euractiv
Despite renewed momentum on EU enlargement, the growing influence of the radical right across the EU risks turning accession into a politically contested battleground, undermining Brussels’ strategic goals in the Balkans and Eastern Europe.
Professor Ioannis Armakolas is Head of the South-East Europe Programme at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Greece’s leading European policy think tank. Ioannis Alexandris is a political risk consultant and a Research Fellow at ELIAMEP.
On 17 April during her visit to Sofia, the Commissioner for EU enlargement Marta Kos called enlargement “crucial” for Europe’s security and competitiveness. Kos noted the bloc made more progress in six months than in the previous five years.
Yet despite this clear commitment from Brussels, another political transformation unfolding within Europe threatens to derail these ambitions: the growing influence of radical right Eurosceptic parties. Once marginalised, these forces are reshaping Europe’s political priorities from within national parliaments and Brussels.
The so-called “cordon sanitaire” – the refusal of mainstream parties to cooperate with far-right actors – is gradually being dismantled. Far-right parties have recently joined government coalitions in Western countries like Italy and the Netherlands while Viktor Orbán in Hungary has been joined at the European Council by like-minded Slovak PM Robert Fico.
This surge is not new. Far-right parties gained ground over the past decade, capitalising on crises like migration and the Eurozone. But they have shifted from purely reactionary anti-EU positions to actively shaping agendas at national and EU levels. In Germany, the CDU has been pressured by AfD’s rise to harden its stance on migration, a firm example of how the radical right is shifting migration policy across Europe.
Compared to other areas, EU enlargement currently flies under the political radar. Yet this could soon change. Despite high-profile exceptions, like Meloni and Orban, most of these parties across Europe either oppose or are sceptical of the accession of more member states to the bloc, linking enlargement to fears around migration, fiscal strain, and a loss of sovereignty, while ignoring the costs of non-enlargement.
Take Germany’s AfD, which frames enlargement as a gateway for increased migration, particularly from Muslim-majority candidate countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina. Austria’s FPÖ cites similar concerns. Marine Le Pen’s RN links enlargement to illegal immigration and organised crime. Far-right narratives frame Western Balkan migration as a source of crime and instability, in line with their broader nativist agendas.
However, past enlargements tell a different story. The 2004 ‘Big Bang’ enlargement round brought economic, social, and geopolitical gains. In Germany, 820,000 workers from the EU10 now contribute to sectors like caregiving and seasonal agriculture, often avoided by domestic labourers. With Germany projected to face a shortfall of up to 5 million workers by 2030, failure to integrate the Western Balkans could deepen labour shortages and hurt competitiveness.
Beyond migration, radical right parties also exaggerate enlargement’s fiscal implications. In net-contributor countries, they target EU policies like the Common Agricultural Policy, portraying them as unfair subsidies. These concerns could intensify if Ukraine – a major agricultural producer – nears membership, fuelling anti-enlargement rhetoric.
Though disingenuous, these parties’ positions matter. Under unanimity rules, enlargement depends not just on candidate progress but also on political will in EU capitals. A single party in a single government can stall the process.
The 2024 Dutch coalition offers a cautionary tale. The inclusion of Geert Wilders’ PVV amplified longstanding scepticism within the political establishment. While PVV dropped some extreme positions to join a four-party coalition, it retained a firm anti-enlargement stance. The coalition agreement states the government reserves the right to “restrict the free movement of persons within the EU if and insofar as expansion of the EU is discussed” – a clear signal that candidate states will face tough scrutiny under the current government.
Public opinion could further politicise the process. In France and Austria, referenda are already possible, or required, for approving new members. With declining public support, radical right parties may push other governments to follow suit. This would turn enlargement into a public battleground. A 2024 survey found that while 65% of EU citizens support a direct vote on enlargement, only 53% would favour it. Notably, support has fallen below 50% in Austria, France, and Germany – all countries where the far right is gaining traction. Public sentiment is trending downward, offering fertile ground for Eurosceptic narratives.
The real risk lies not in the process of enlargement itself but in letting radical right forces dictate the terms of debate. Pro-enlargement policymakers must reframe the narrative around long-term benefits and communicate beyond Brussels echo chambers. Efforts should target rural and fiscally conservative areas in net-contributing states, where far-right messaging resonates most. The aim should be to address public concerns about potential accession costs while making the geopolitical and economic case for enlargement.
The stakes are high. Trump’s second presidency has accelerated a trend of US disengagement, compounding Europe’s external pressures. The bloc cannot afford to backtrack in the Balkans and Eastern Europe, regions eyed by Russia and China. Failure to act risks the bloc’s competitiveness and strategic leverage. Rather than viewing enlargement as a burden, EU capitals must acknowledge that the Western Balkans, Ukraine, and Moldova hold strategic value for the EU’s future. The accession process must be effectively shielded from populist assaults or electoral opportunism.
The original article: belongs to Euractiv .
